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by Emirjon Kaçaj*
Introduction
This article analyzes the interrelationship between state and individual criminal responsibility in
international law. It argues that while international courts and related instruments governing these
two regimes of liability suggest a clear separation between state and individual criminal
responsibility, in practice they are closely connected.[1] By analyzing international jurisprudence,
this article argues that there is no “pure separation” between state and individual criminal
responsibility and that prior determinations of the latter significantly impact the establishment of
former.[2] This article argues that a dependence on individual criminal liability would jeopardize
the eventual accountability of the state by “hiding” behind the responsibility of the individual.
Background
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) and of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (IMTFE) paved the way to the establishment of individual criminal responsibility in
international law.[3] Individual criminal responsibility broadened with the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and of the International Criminal Court (ICC).[4]These bodies ensure
that individuals could no longer “hide” behind “abstract entities”, i.e. states.[5]
Inevitably, the affirmation of individual criminal liability raised questions with regard to its
interaction with state responsibility, which is determined by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). Hence, what is still debatable in international law is the interrelationship between state and
individual criminal responsibility and when the same criminal conduct gives rise to both regimes
of liability.[6] Therefore, having in mind the significant development of individual criminal
responsibility, its repercussions on state responsibility and how these two regimes of liability
interact assume a particular importance.
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Analysis
International instruments suggest that state and individual criminal responsibility are separate
regimes of liability. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility and the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind imply this
separation.[7] The International Law Commission acknowledged that the punishment of
individuals who are organs of the state does not exhaust issues related to state
responsibility.[8] Hence, state and individual criminal responsibility are considered separate
regimes of responsibility in international criminal law giving rise to dual responsibility, i.e. state
and individual liability.[9]
The separation between state and individual criminal responsibility is also suggested by the fact
that different enforcement mechanisms deal with these two regimes of liability, i.e. the ICTY for
individual criminal responsibility and the ICJ for state responsibility.[10] However, it is argued
that this does not imply that these two regimes are not connected.[11] For instance, in Tadić the
ICTY determined that the Bosnian-Serb politician was individually responsible from crimes
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in doing so it also considered issues of state
liability.[12] When the ICJ was called to rule on Serbia’s responsibility during the conflict in
former Yugoslavia, it criticized the ICTY for making recourse to rules of state responsibility and
it found that Serbia was not guilty of genocide in relation to the crimes committed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.[13]
In the 2015 Genocide case, while the ICJ found that Serbia was not guilty of genocide in relation
to Croatia for crimes committed during the conflict in former Yugoslavia, it reaffirmed the
separation between state and individual criminal responsibility.[14] In particular, the ICJ noted
that states may be held responsible under the Genocide Convention even though no individual was
convicted of the crime.[15] Hence, the ICJ supported a clear separation between state and
individual criminal responsibility, underlining their different legal regimes and
aims.[16] However, this separation is blurred given that the ICJ considered ICTY’s prior
determinations as “significant factor” in assessing Serbia’s genocidal intent.[17]Hence, the ICJ
considered as significant factor the fact that the ICTY never charged any individual on account of
genocide against the Croat population.[18]The ICJ added that mens rea, (psychological element)
required by the Genocide Convention, must be established in order to determine state
responsibility.[19] Hence, the ICJ applied typical requirements of individual criminal
responsibility, i.e. mens rea.[20] However, considering that states are abstract entities, ICJ’s
recourse to prior determinations on individual criminal responsibility appears to have been
inevitable.[21]
Conclusion
While in theory international instruments and jurisprudence suggest a strict separation between
state and individual criminal responsibility, in practice, these liability regimes are
interrelated.[22] Arguably, this interrelationship presents signs of dependence, considering that
individual criminal responsibility has significant repercussions on the determination of state
responsibility.[23]
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While the establishment of individual criminal liability contributes to the enforcement of
international law, attention should not be shifted away from state responsibility.[24] Courts should
be cautious in giving weight to prior determinations of individual criminal responsibility.[25] This
would ensure that states could not find “shelter” behind prior determinations on individual criminal
responsibility.[26]
ENDNOTES
[1]See infra notes 7-9.
[2]See infra note 21.
[3]See Article 6 of the IMT Charter and Article 5 of the IMTFE Charter. See generally Ciara Damgaard, Individual
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that the purpose of these two regimes of liability is different because while individual criminal responsibility has a
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for a wrongful act). See also Beatrice Bonafè, Reassessing Dual Responsibility for International Crimes, 73 Sequência
(Florianópolis) 20 (2016).
[17]See 2015 Genocide case at ¶¶ 187 and 440. See also 2007 Genocide case at ¶ 217.
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[22]See Beatrice Bonafè, The Relationship between State and individual responsibility for international crimes 200
(2009) (confirming the existence of points of contact between state and individual criminal responsibility in
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prior determinations of the ICTY).
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Responsible for Genocide?, 18 EJIL 641(2007) (arguing that state and individual criminal liability are fully
independent of each other).
[24]See Trial of Major War Criminals before the IMT, Nuremberg, (Nov. 1945 – Oct. 1946), at 223 (affirming that
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[25]See 2015 Genocide Case, Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde at ¶ 17-21 (criticizing the Court for taking into
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4

International Coverage Spring 2018

Protecting Environmental Defenders
February 27, 2018
by Page Monji
One of the first murders of an defender of environmental rights in 2017 was Isidro Balenegro
Lopez, a subsistence famer, activist, and leader among the Tarahumara people. He was a Goldman
Environmental Prize winner in 2005 for his peaceful action against deforestation from illegal
logging in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua. Amidst threats against his and his family’s
lives, Balenegro left the community, but was murdered upon returning to visit a family member in
Coloradas e la Virgen. Balenegro’s story is one of many cases of deaths and increased risk of harm
to land and environmental activists in 2017.
With the UN’s release of the Sustainable Development Goals, the alarming lesson in these
casualties and escalating violence is whether our global priorities also protect the defenders of
those initiatives. The Sustainable Development Goals list among its environmental priorities
climate action (including initiatives combatting climate change and the impacts of emissions), life
below water (including the conservation and sustainable use of water resources and marine life)
and life on land (including sustainable use of land resources).
According to a report released by Global Witness, 197 land and environmental defenders were
murdered globally in 2017. The report defines defenders as “people who take peaceful action to
protect land or environment rights, whether in their own personal capacity or professionally.” This
includes family members, friends, and colleagues of the defender who may have been murdered
in retaliation of the defender’s efforts or in the same attack as that which resulted in the defender’s
death. While the Global Witness’s coverage is limited, the underreporting of verified cases
highlights the challenges in validating violence globally. Tension between government,
companies, and local communities predominantly were driven by mining and oil, logging,
agribusiness, poaching, water and dams.
While Global Witness largely tracks verified murders, the Environmental Justice (EJ) Atlas tracks
claims and testimonies of communities engaged in ecological conflict. So far, the EJ Atlas
recorded 2,344 current claims of tension globally across 10 categories: Nuclear, Mineral Ores and
Building Extractions, Waste Management, Biomass and Land Conflicts, Fossil Fuels and Climate
Justice/Energy, Water Management, Infrastructure and Built Environment, Tourism Recreation,
Biodiversity Conservation Conflicts, Industrial and Utilities Conflicts. The data illustrates the
magnitude of global tension surrounding environmental causes and the onus upon governments
and organizations to protect the activists who are at the front lines of environmental causes.
Large scale ecological social tension often results in the murder, criminalization,
and disappearances of human rights defenders. The cases presented by Global Witness and
Environmental Justice highlight infringements of international law prohibiting violence against
human rights defenders. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’s protections
include the right to life, liberty, security, freedom of expression, prohibition on torture, peaceful
assembly and association. Additionally, the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders contains
protections accorded to human rights defenders, which include the right to peacefully assemble, to
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form non-governmental organizations, to freedom of expression regarding human rights
complaints, and to protection under domestic law.
The magnitude of escalating violence and casualties highlight the increased risk for environmental
defenders. Furthermore, the heightened vulnerability poses critical questions of whether our
global initiatives sufficiently protect the defenders of those efforts and who is best responsible to
protect these advocates.
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International Human Rights Through the
Eyes of TWAIL
March 23, 2018
by Achalie Kumarage*
Over a period of years, a discourse has been developing questioning the potential of the
international human rights framework. International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is accused
of failing to attain its aspirations and to be inclusive of diverse human experiences. Its enforcement
towards different states has been a subject of controversy. The critique of IHRL has intensified
with the recent trend of Western liberal democracies turning inward. The debt crises in
Europe, poverty, racism, xenophobia, immigration, and alarming concerns of national security
today all pose compelling questions for IHRL. The critique by Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL) of IHRL is increasingly relevant against this backdrop. Through the
lens of TWAIL, this Article deconstructs the foundations of IHRL to ascertain its limitations in
responding to these existing challenges.
What is TWAIL?
Originally aimed at critically examining the foundations of international law, TWAIL progressed
as an adventure and an experiment. Emerging formally in the 1990s, TWAIL
is distinguishable from a mere method of analysis. Professor Antony Anghie, a prominent scholar
in the area, describes TWAIL as a particular set of concerns that a number of scholars from various
locations with different perspectives and interests utilize. TWAIL as of now is in its second
development epoch.
TWAIL primarily aims to understand how international law affects people in the ‘third world.’
‘Third world’ no longer is constrained to a geographical rubric or as a label for under developed
and developing countries. Instead, it is conceptualized as a social movement geared at furthering
the interests of oppressed or marginalized people. These groups could mean under developed
countries of the Global South or could even be marginalized populations in the developed Western
liberal democracies, such as aborigines or natives, people of color, women, and poverty ridden
cohorts in the community.
TWAIL scholarship unravels how dynamics of international politics and transnational interaction
have profoundly impacted and redefined IHRL. Although TWAIL’s critique of IHRL takes many
forms, its core criticisms could be divided into three substantive layers, for the purpose of this
Article: Eurocentrism, top-down approach, and non-inclusivity of all diverse human experiences.

*
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TWAIL’s Critique of IHRL
TWAIL’s approach to IHRL is divided. On the one hand IHRL is seen as a mechanism through
which people of the third world seek protection from depredations of state power, while on the
other it is seen as everyday imperialism. The latter refers to the imposition of Western liberal
morals upon relatively less powerful countries. It can be illustrated by an analogy of colonialization
where Western European values were imposed on colonies, in the guise of ‘civilization,’ without
any regard to the domestic systems of law and governance and the local cultures. The monolithic
mindset that was present in the inception of IHRL could be failing to grapple with the current
issues of addressing poverty, social integration of diversity, and evaluating cultures. As TWAIL
scholar and feminist Ratna Kapur asserts, the human rights promise of progress, emancipation,
and universalism is thus exposed as a myopic project in light of the panic over national security,
sexual morality, and cultural survival.
Eurocentrism
The Western European origin of the international legal framework is a fact. Legal historians such
as J.H.W. Verzijl claim international law to be an exclusive product of the European mind.
The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law states that the development of
international law, would “generally ignore the violence, ruthlessness, and arrogance which
accompanied the dissemination of Western rules, and the destruction of other legal cultures in
which that dissemination resulted.” Further, it “even discards such extra-European experiences
and forms which were discontinued as a result of domination and colonization by European
powers” and deems it “irrelevant to a (continuing) history of international law.” It continues to be
Western, not merely because of its origin, but also owing to the absence of any substantive nonWestern contribution to its development. Though there have been cohesive contributions by
scholars from the third world, their viewpoints have been diluted in Western thinking and
education and the forceful counter challenges waged by first world actors.
Although birthed from the ashes of the atrocities committed during World War II, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the nine core international human rights treaties are
founded upon the predominant contribution by the First World and Western European states.
Therefore, the basic framework of IHRL is reliant on an illusion of symmetry and equal status to
all countries rooted in sovereignty. Some scholars now contend that it is the untiring efforts of
the Global South that sustained IHRL subsequent to the 1960s. Among the TWAIL proponents,
Latin American scholars seem to come out stronger in the International Human Rights fora.
However, their role is more profound in developing an exemplary regional approach to human
rights thorough the Inter-American system.
Complexities have arisen through the change of power dynamics in the world. As new democracies
such as India, Brazil, and the Republic of China are emerging powerfully on the global stage,
Eurocentrism that made domination possible in the colonial era is no longer a fact. Elsewhere in
the world, the political dynamics are becoming even more complex with Arabic
countries opposing Western secularization. In view of these changes, a revision of IHRL in a more
inclusive and wider perspective is necessary.
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Top-Down Approach
The top-down approach of IHRL has been the subject of criticism of many scholars. The approach
illustrates the emanation of IHRL from global elite actors, including international organizations
such as the United Nations, perpetuating dominance as well as tools for domination. The top-down
approach to IHRL can be criticized on two key points. Firstly, as an inevitable consequence of
Eurocentrism. Secondly, as a product of a collective state-level effort which doesn’t adequately
represent the ethos and aspirations of the common people.
The first has its roots in the era of colonialism and imperialism where the Western liberal
democracies, in particular Western Europe, dominated international legislating. However, one
could argue that the IHRL framework was set in motion following World War II, which was a
more diverse stage led by the United States. Nevertheless, the final traces of colonialism were
present as late as the 1970’s in states such as Taiwan. In fact, it is claimed that some regions such
as Africa and even the Middle East are victims of neo-colonialism, for which IHRL is manipulated
to penalize the states and its people rather than as a tool for their “salvation.”
The second criticism is closely connected and is likely giving rise to the existing IHRL violations.
The states were exclusively involved in founding IHRL (as opposed to developing it later on).
The charter based system’s initial stages did not involve independent experts or civil society.
Implementation of this legal framework exemplifies a top-down approach. This is particularly
important in using IHRL as a counter-majoritarian instrument against state power. Moreover, the
political power dynamics affect enforcement of IHRL. The United States, a founding contributor
of IHRL, has been criticized by many TWAIL scholars on its’ compliance with the framework,
especially when it comes to issues such as torture.
Non-Inclusivity of Diverse Human Experience
The cumulative result of the above two realities has been the non-inclusivity of diverse human
experiences in IHRL. Being inclusive of diverse human experience, a seemingly impossible
taskattainable as IHRL is stipulated in normative and broad principles rather than ‘laws’ in a
narrower and more domestic sense. An illustration of this is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), which is not a treaty in the strictest sense but has become binding in customary
international law.
Outside evaluation of cultural diversity and non-inclusivity is a continuing problem in IHRL. This
is evident in the neo liberal economic agenda of the international superpowers. The major
compelling question TWAIL raises is: Can Western liberal democracies impose the blueprint for
political and economic development for the advancement of other countries in the world?
TWAIL further unravels that some of the new human rights challenges before Western liberal
democracies have been crippling the third world for many years such as war, terrorism, and
poverty. TWAIL scholars express displeasure in the double standards of the international
community in implementing IHRL. The discourse has been built around dealing with cases such
as terror and torture in Afghanistan as opposed to Guantanamo Bay, and proposals for pre-emptive
self-defense by first world countries such as the United States, Europe, and Russia.
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Conclusion
In light of the above analysis one could naturally demand an alternative discourse. Scholars such
as Kapur, in fact, enquire if the human rights project that “held out the promise of a grand spicy
fete mutated into an insipid appetizer.” However, TWAIL scholars such as Anghie are of the
opinion that there is no equally profound alternate discourse to entirely replace IHRL. Others are
more hopeful and are exploring additional non-liberal emancipatory possibilities.
As the Oxford handbook states, although we may not be able to learn from the mistakes of the
past, TWAIL promises a better understanding of the character of a particular legal order, its
promise, and its limits. IHRL therefore should welcome TWAIL as a reconstructive project, which
potentially credits the aspirations it desires to achieve.

10

International Coverage Spring 2018

Assisted
Reproductive
Technology,
Parenthood, and Rights Implications
May 28, 2018
by Achalie Kumarage
With the increasingly pervasive role played by technology in assisting reproduction,
imperative questions are raised in terms of right to life, parenthood, and family. Highly contested
cases have been fought before national and international courts over the past twenty years. The
root cause of all such cases is the fact that human life is no longer only created by conventional,
natural means. With assisted reproductive technology (ART), what once were questions of fate
have turned into matters of choice intertwined with rights.
Evincing the complexity of this phenomenon, the latest data suggests that there are more than
620,000 cryo-preserved embryos in the United States alone. The vast majority of these cryopreserved embryos are still being considered for use in the family-building efforts of the couples
who created them. Questions related to the use of these embryos particularly arise following
decisions by genetic parents to separate as a couple, divorce, or upon deciding the number of
children.
Focusing on In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), this Article explores the complicated rights of parenthood
and family life in IVF, and analyzes the varying approaches developed by national and
international courts in addressing difficult rights-related questions.
Assisted Reproductive Technology: Definitions and the Legal Framework
ART has grown in both means and effectiveness over the years. The reproductive process can now
be severed, allowing interventions or substitutions at different stages of the reproductive process.
The key ART for this analysis, IVF, is the process of fertilization by extracting eggs and sperm,
and manually combining them in a laboratory dish. The embryo(s) is then either transferred to the
uterus or preserved. Cryo-preservation aids the embryo to survive for years. The possible number
of years for preservation is generally stipulated by the law. The success rate of IVF, though it
varies from case to case, is said to be between twenty to fifty percent, and there is no
significant difference in success rates between fresh and frozen embryos. Often the process is
carried out by parties subject to a contractual agreement, which governs the process and its results.
All key international and regional human rights instruments enshrine a right to privacy, family life,
and the non-interference of the state to decisions made within the private sphere. At the same time,
they uphold a right to life. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) in Articles
12 and 16 upholds the same, while the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) expresses similar rights in Article 17. Regional human rights bodies such as the InterAmerican system and the European system are more promising and strongly advocate for these
rights. For instance, the American Convention of Human Rights (1969) upholds a guarantee of
non-suspension of the right to family life (Article 17) by the State. The instruments further grant
equal rights to men and women to make decisions pertaining to family life.
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International law, however, allows leeway for national laws governing these rights. There is
minimum guidance set by international law in resolving issues involving embryo preservation. In
the United States, there are no federal regulations governing the disposition of frozen embryos
created through assistive technology. However, some countries, such as the United Kingdom,
have domestic statutes. Generally, though the IVF process is carried out subject to a contractual
agreement, this is not always upheld by the courts in resolving disputes and may not necessarily
address particular future issues that can arise.
Compelling Questions Raised by the Discourse Surrounding Rights
As described above, the ART process adds multiple new dynamics to the natural reproductive
process. In light of this fact, there are two key substantive rights-related challenges that IVF poses
for national and international courts: (1) balancing the competing constitutional rights to procreate
and not procreate, and (2) tracing the place of the embryo in the debate of personhood. As the
analysis of IVF develops, it is hard to overlook its stark resemblance to the abortion debate and
the views expressed pertaining to the issues of rights and life.
•

Balancing Competing Rights

Harvard law professor and renowned academic in the area Glenn Cohen raises the difficulty of
balancing one person’s constitutional right to procreate with another’s countervailing
constitutional right not to procreate. Designating his point in the equation between the genetic
parent and the gestational parent, he opines that the rights of both parties are equally strong in the
debate. Drawing an analogy between this issue and the abortion debate, specifically Roe v. Wade,
he questions “if women have the right to not be forced to be a gestational parent, do men – or
women – have the right not to be forced to be a genetic parent?”
United States courts have addressed these matters through three approaches: the balancing
interests approach, the contractual approach, and the contemporaneous mutual consent approach.
The balancing interests approach resolves disputes by “considering the position of parties,
significance of their interests and the relative burden imposed by differing resolutions.” In
Colorado in the case of In re the Marriage of Drake F. Rooks and Mandy Rook, the Academy of
Adoption and Assisted Reproductive Attorneys said that courts must take a “balancing of
interests” approach in such disputes, but should “give special weight to the partner who does not
want to have genetic offspring.” On the other hand, the contractual approach resorts to giving
effect to the agreement devised by the parties at the point of pursing IVF, given that the contract
stands valid and enforceable. Finally, the mutual consent approach resonates with the second
approach, favoring the consent expressed in a valid contract and any modifications carried out with
contemporaneous mutual consent of the other party.
Lisa Ikemoto, a bioethics professor at the University of California, has said that one party’s right
not to procreate has usually been considered to trump the other’s right to procreate. Aptly
summarizing the debate, Professor Cohen highlights that although the first child born from a cryopreserved embryo was in 1984, United States courts “have not been addressing this issue headon.”
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Similarly, other countries are also grappling with various legal issues arising as a result of
burgeoning IVF practices. In China, parents of a deceased couple were recently granted the right
over fertilized eggs of the couple. Having gone through a “legal minefield” until their grandchild
was born through a surrogate mother, the four grandparents are now preparing to legally establish
their relations to the child through DNA testing.
International courts adjudicate similar cases with a relatively loose approach. This is due to the
tedious exercise of having to balance competing rights enshrined in international conventions with
applicable national law. The European Court of Human Rights often predicates on the parties’
consent, while giving substantial weight to the “margin of appreciation” to give effect to relevant
domestic legislative provisions. This is evident in judgments such as Evans v. United
Kingdom (2005) where the court rejected the claim of violation of the right to privacy and family
life based on withdrawal of consent by one party. Withdrawal of consent was the cause for
termination agreed to by the parties at the time of making the contract, and national laws reflected
respecting the decision of the parties. On the other hand, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica depicts an instance where the right to family life
(Article 17) and the right to privacy (Article 11) superseded concerns of the right to life. The
court upheld that the non-availability of IVF itself could amount to a violation of the right to family
life and privacy, after Costa Rica had banned IVF on the basis that it violated the right to life.
On a different note, some scholars opine that more than two parties can be involved in these
disputes and that personal intention is a more significant element. Since the IVF process can be
severed it becomes depersonalized and multiple persons may be involved in one or a few stages of
the reproductive process and then later withdraw from it after their role is fulfilled.
•

Embryos & Personhood

Is the human embryo a person? The answer to this question has significant implications for human
rights. Answers to this question could either lift or strengthen the guarantee of non-interference by
the state to a person’s privacy and family life, depending on the state’s interest in protecting life.
Fertilization is a process, therefore, personhood does not attach the moment an embryo starts to
develop. The scientific view is that the embryo is not a person during its ‘pre-embryo’ stage of
fourteen days. In In re the Marriage of Drake F. Rooks and Mandy Rooks, the counsel for Drake
Rooks asserted that the constitutional right to be a parent may not have any bearing upon matters
passing the point of conception. Arguing that the case is no longer about separate human cells but
a formed fetus, the counsel stated that the cases of frozen embryos are an “unknown territory.”
This sentiment reflects strong parallels to the abortion debate which ultimately boils down to a
matter of individual choice versus a matter of life, as decided in Roe v. Wade and more recently
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016).
The distinction between embryos and personhood is unsettled at a global level, and international
courts prefer to give effect to the laws of the jurisdiction from which a case is
emanating. Rulings of the European Court of Human Rights best exemplify this position.
Conclusion

13

International Coverage Spring 2018
In resolving disputes in the area, different approaches are suggested by scholars. Some propose
proceeding with the contractual approach while others propose a property approach as an
alternative. In the case of Mimi Lee and James Cohen, from California, it was expressed that “the
policy best suited to ensuring that these disputes are resolved in a cleareyed manner — unswayed
by the turmoil, emotion and accusations that attend to contested proceedings in family court — is
to give effect to the intentions of the parties at the time of the decision at issue.” Courts in the
United States and internationally have frequently precipitated on this contractual approach.
Many of the questions brought in the ART and procreation debate resonate with concerns and
questions that were raised during the abortion debate. Such similarities create the possibility of
further pushing the issue into a grey area in which law and policy makers hesitate to tread. The
dynamics of this matter are so increasingly complex that leaving it unaddressed, or to be resolved
only on a case by case basis, might lead to an exacerbated human rights battle in the near future.
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